Data protection
Latest updates - 19 June 2025
19 June 2025 - This page was published
- Terms used in this chapter
- Definitions in the UK GDPR and the 2018 Act
- Data protection principles
- Processing of special categories of personal data
- Data subject rights
- Automated decision-making
- Obligations of controllers
- Logging of law enforcement processing
- Codes of Conduct
- International transfers of personal data
- Safeguards for processing for research etc purposes
- National security
- Intelligence services
- Information Commissioner’s role
- Enforcement
- Protection of prohibitions, restrictions and data subject’s rights
- Miscellaneous
Terms used in this chapter
The 2018 Act and the UK GDPR
This is a provision to explain that this part of the DUAA amends the DPA and the UK GDPR.
Definitions in the UK GDPR and the 2018 Act
Meaning of research and statistical purposes
This section inserts text into the UK GDPR to explain what is meant by:
- processing for the purposes of scientific research;
- processing for the purposes of historical research; and
- processing for statistical purposes.
The inserted text draws on the wording of the existing recitals to the UK GDPR.
The section provides that scientific research can include:
- commercial research;
- processing for technological development or demonstration, so far as these activities can reasonably be described as scientific;
- fundamental or applied research, so far as these activities can reasonably be described as scientific; and
- public health research, but only if conducted in the public interest.
It says that historical research can include processing for the purposes of genealogical research.
Finally, it says that processing for statistical purposes means an organisation can process for statistical surveys or to produce statistical results, so long as it:
- aggregates the results it produced (so they no longer amount to personal information); and
- uses neither the personal information that it used, nor the results it produced, to make decisions or support measures about the people whose personal information it has used.
The main effect of this section is to make the interpretative guidance in the recitals legally binding.
There is one difference in that the recitals cite public health research as an example of scientific research. Whereas the DUAA restricts the type of public health research that can fall within the definition to public health research “where the study is conducted in the public interest” only.
Consent to processing for the purposes of scientific research
This section inserts text into the UK GDPR, to allow broad consent to processing for the purposes of scientific research.
It draws on the wording of the existing recitals to the UK GDPR. The effect is to make the interpretative guidance in the recitals legally binding.
It allows people to consent to their personal information being used for an “area of scientific research”, so long as:
- it was not possible for an organisation to identify the exact purpose of the research at the time it obtained the consent;
- seeking consent about the area of scientific research is consistent with generally recognised ethical standards relevant to the area of research; and
- people are given the opportunity to only consent to processing for part of the research.
Consent to law enforcement processing
This section inserts the definition of consent already present in the UK GDPR into part 3 of the DPA that applies to law enforcement processing by competent authorities.
Data protection principles
Lawfulness of processing
This section introduces a new lawful basis for processing into the UK GDPR.
The new lawful basis allows processing that is necessary for reasons specified in an annex of “recognised legitimate interests”. This annex is inserted into the UK GDPR by schedule 4 - lawfulness of processing: recognised legitimate interests to the DUAA.
It differs from the ‘standard’ legitimate interests lawful basis for processing. There is still a necessity test, but there is no requirement for an organisation to carry out an additional balancing test to balance the benefits of this processing against the impact on the rights and freedom of the people whose personal information it is using.
This section also amends the ‘standard’ legitimate interests lawful basis for processing by inserting, and defining, some examples of processing that may be necessary for a legitimate interest. These are:
- direct marketing;
- intra-group transfers for administrative purposes; and
- ensuring the security of network and information systems.
These examples are taken from the recitals to the UK GDPR, so the effect is to make existing interpretative guidance in the recitals legally binding.
This section also adds some wording to clarify that the existing public task basis only applies to the organisation’s own tasks. This means an organisation supporting a public authority in the exercise of its tasks should rely on another basis, such as legitimate interests (or the new recognised legitimate interests basis).
It also makes some changes to related powers of the Secretary of State.
The purpose limitation
This section restructures and makes some amendments to the existing provisions that set out when an organisation can consider a new use of personal information to be compatible with the original purpose it collected it for.
It confirms that these provisions apply in addition to, not instead of, the requirement to satisfy a lawful basis for processing.
It provides two slightly different sets of rules. One for personal information that an organisation originally collected under the lawful basis of consent (consented personal information). And one for use when an organisation originally collected the personal information under any of the other lawful bases for processing (non-consented personal information).
For consented personal information the rules are more restrictive and provide that a new use is only considered compatible if an organisation:
- gets consent for the new use;
- carries out the processing to comply with a data protection principle;
- uses the information for a reason listed in a new annex of “processing to be treated as compatible”, and it is not reasonable to expect it to obtain new consent; or
- carries out the processing because it is necessary for certain public interest reasons listed in article 23(1) of the UK GDPR, and it is not reasonable to expect it to obtain new consent.
For non-consented personal information this section provides that a new use is considered compatible if an organisation:
- gets consent for the new processing;
- carries out the processing for the purposes of research, archiving in the public interest or statistical processing, and in accordance with the provisions relating to this processing;
- carries out the processing to comply with a data protection principle;
- uses the information for a reason listed in a new annex of “processing to be treated as compatible”; or
- carries out the process because it is necessary for certain public interest reasons laid down by law and listed in article 23(1) of the UK GDPR.
The annex of “processing to be treated as compatible” is inserted into the UK GDPR by schedule 5 - purpose limitation: processing to be treated as compatible with original purpose to the DUAA.
The provisions for non-consented personal information don’t say that these are the ‘only’ circumstances in which new processing can be compatible. Therefore, there also remains the option for an organisation to assess compatibility for this type of processing.
This section confirms the matters that an organisation should take into account when assessing compatibility in this way (also known as applying the compatibility test). These are the same matters as already apply under the pre-DUAA UK GDPR and so we’ve not listed them here.
It also makes some changes to related powers of the Secretary of State.
Processing in reliance on relevant international law
This section amends the public task lawful basis for processing that applies when an organisation uses personal information for the purposes of:
- carrying out a specific task in the public interest that is laid down by law; or
- exercising an official authority that is laid down by law (eg a public body’s tasks, functions, duties or powers).
The amendment provides that relevant international law (as listed in a new schedule) as well as UK domestic law, can provide, or ‘lay down’, the legal basis for this processing.
The section designates the “Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, signed on 3 October 2019” as relevant international law, by adding it to the new schedule. This is an agreement that facilitates the transfer of some telecommunications information between the UK and the US.
It makes a similar amendment to allow relevant international law (as listed in the new schedule) to lay down an article 23(1) public interest reason for the further processing of personal information.
It also authorises the use of special category or criminal offence information based on the same list of relevant international laws.
Processing of special categories of personal data
Elected representatives responding to requests
This section extends the time period in which outgoing MPs, or other elected representatives, can continue to process special category personal information for the purposes of responding to requests from their former constituents. The section extends this period from four days to 30 days after the date of the relevant general election.
Processing of special categories of personal data
This section makes some changes to the powers that the Secretary of State has for the special categories of personal information provisions.
Data subject rights
Fees and reasons for responses to data subjects’ requests about law enforcement processing
This section provides that if a competent authority refuses to deal with a request because it considers it to be manifestly unfounded or excessive, then it must:
- tell the person making the request why it has refused it; and
- advise them of their right to complain to the ICO.
It must do this without undue delay and within a set time limit. This mirrors existing requirements on other organisations who are not competent authorities.
It also makes some changes to related powers of the Secretary of State.
Time limits for responding to data subjects’ requests
This section provides that the time limit an organisation has to respond to requests from people whose personal information it is using (data subjects) commences when an organisation receives:
- a request;
- further information it has requested and reasonably needs to identify the information or use of information that the request is about; or
- a fee it has requested for a manifestly unfounded or excessive request.
This section also inserts new provisions into parts 3 and 4 of the DPA to allow competent authorities and intelligence services to extend the time they have to comply by up to two months, due to the complexity or number of requests from a particular requester. This aligns with the existing provision in UK GDPR.
Information to be provided to data subjects
This section amends the requirements about an organisation providing people with privacy information.
For article 13 of the UK GDPR (that applies if an organisation collects personal information directly from the person whose information it is using) the section provides that an organisation doesn’t have to provide privacy information if:
- it intends to further process personal information for research purposes, in accordance with the provisions covering this type of use; and
- providing the privacy information is impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort.
In these cases, an organisation must protect people’s rights in other ways, including by making the information publicly available.
For article 14 (that applies if an organisation obtains personal information from someone other than the person whose information it is using) the section doesn’t change the requirements. But it does amend them so they are easier to follow.
The section also clarifies that disproportionate effort depends on, among other things:
- the number of data subjects;
- the age of the personal information; and
- any appropriate safeguards applied to the processing.
This is taken from the existing recitals.
Searches in response to data subjects’ requests
This section provides that when dealing with requests from people for their information (subject access requests) an organisation only has to carry out reasonable and proportionate searches for relevant information.
It makes the same amendment to law enforcement and intelligence services processing.
Data subjects’ rights to information: legal professional privilege exemption
This section applies to processing by a competent authority for law enforcement purposes. It introduces a new exemption from the right of subject access, for information that is subject to legal professional privilege (LPP).
It provides that if a competent authority decides to claim the exemption, it must inform the person who has made the request about:
- this decision;
- its reasons for making it;
- their right to complain to the ICO; and
- their right to apply to the court to have the decision overturned.
It also provides that these requirements don’t apply if providing this information would:
- be subject to LPP itself; or
- conflict with a duty of confidentiality.
The competent authority must maintain a record of its decision not to provide information and give this to the ICO on request.
The section also gives people the right to request that the ICO check that the competent authority has properly applied the exemption.
Automated decision-making
Automated decision-making
This section expands the circumstances in which an organisation can make significant decisions based solely on its automated processing of personal information.
Under the pre-DUAA law, these decisions were restricted unless they were:
- necessary for the purposes of a contract between a person and an organisation;
- permitted by UK law (with appropriate safeguards); or
- done with the consent of the person whose personal information the organisation would use.
This section removes these restrictions, allowing an organisation to make solely automated decisions in a wider range of situations as long as it has appropriate safeguards in place.
The appropriate safeguards are very similar to those that applied under the pre-DUAA law and include that an organisation must:
- provide the person whose personal information it has used with information about the decision;
- enable that person to make representations about the decision;
- enable that person to obtain human intervention about the decision; and
- enable that person to contest the decision.
The effect of this change is to potentially allow an organisation to rely on any of the lawful bases, apart from the new recognised legitimate interests basis, when it makes significant automated decisions about people.
The pre-DUAA law also restricted the use of special categories of personal information in automated decision-making. An organisation could only use this information:
- with consent; or
- where necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of UK law that includes suitable safeguards.
This section keeps the restriction on the use of special category personal information.
The section provides that:
- a decision is based solely on automated processing if there is no meaningful human involvement in taking it;
- a decision is a significant decision if it has a legal effect, or a similarly significant effect, on the person whose personal information the organisation is using; and
- when deciding whether there is meaningful human involvement in a decision, an organisation must consider the extent to which the decision is based on profiling.
For law enforcement processing the changes are similar.
The section retains the pre-DUAA restrictions for sensitive processing. These are that a competent authority must:
- base the processing on the explicit consent of the person whose information it is using; or
- be required or authorised by law to make the decision.
It removes these restrictions for non-sensitive processing, so long as a competent authority has appropriate safeguards in place.
The section includes the same safeguards for law enforcement processing as it does for general processing. But it also includes an alternative safeguard of proactive re-consideration of the decision with human involvement.
A competent authority can use this if it is necessary to:
- avoid obstructing an official or legal inquiry, investigation or procedure;
- avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties;
- protect public security;
- protect national security; or
- protect the rights and freedoms of others.
For law enforcement processing:
- a decision is based solely on automated processing if there is no meaningful human involvement in taking it;
- a decision is a significant decision if it has an adverse legal effect, or similarly significant adverse effect, on the person whose personal information the competent authority is using; and
- when considering whether there is meaningful human involvement in a decision, a competent authority must consider the extent to which the decision is based on profiling.
For intelligence services processing, the DUAA retains the existing restrictions on the circumstances in which an intelligence service can make significant decisions based on entirely automated processing. These are that an intelligence service must:
- carry out the processing because it is necessary for the purposes of a contract with the person whose personal information it is using
- be required or authorised by UK law; or
- base the processing on the consent of the person whose personal information it is using.
This applies for both sensitive and non-sensitive processing.
The DUAA provides that for intelligence services processing a decision is based on entirely automated processing if the decision-making process does not include an opportunity for a human being to accept, reject or influence the decision.
Finally, this section also makes some changes to related powers of the Secretary of State.
Obligations of controllers
Data protection by design: children’s higher protection matters
This section applies to the providers of online services that are likely to be used by children. They are required to make sure they consider the following when putting in place technical and organisational measures to ensure they comply with the data protection principles:
- How they can best protect and support children using the services.
- The fact that children merit specific protection with regard to their personal information, because they may be less aware of the risks and consequences involved.
- The fact that children have different needs at different ages and at different stages of development.
Logging of law enforcement processing
Logging of law enforcement processing
This section removes the requirement for a competent authority to keep a log of the justification or reasons why it has consulted or disclosed personal information it holds for law enforcement purposes. Other logging requirements remain (such as keeping a log of the identity of the person who has consulted or disclosed the personal information).
Codes of Conduct
General processing and codes of conduct
This section makes some changes to the reporting requirements for bodies charged with monitoring compliance with approved codes of conduct.
Law enforcement processing and codes of conduct
This section makes new provisions that allow the introduction of codes of conduct for law enforcement processing.
It provides that a competent authority may use its adherence to a law enforcement code of conduct to demonstrate its compliance with the law. It also gives an indicative list of topics that a code provider might usefully include in a code of conduct.
Finally, it gives the ICO some related duties, including providing expert bodies with an opinion on draft codes.
International transfers of personal data
Transfers of personal data to third countries and international organisations
This section lists the schedules to the DUAA that make the substantive changes to the international transfers data protection requirements. These are schedule 7 –Transfers of personal data to third countries etc: general processing and schedule 8 - Transfers of personal data to third countries etc: law enforcement processing.
Safeguards for processing for research etc purposes
Safeguards for processing for research etc purposes
This section restructures the provisions about the safeguards that an organisation must apply when processing for the purposes of research, archiving in the public interest and statistical processing. It puts them into a single chapter of the UK GDPR.
There are no substantive changes to the safeguards themselves, although the drafting makes it clear that processing carried out for the purpose of data minimisation, including pseudonymisation, is permitted.
It also makes some related changes to the powers of the Secretary of State.
Section 86: consequential provision
This section makes consequential amendments, as a result of the changes to the research, archiving in the public interest and statistical processing safeguards provisions.
National security
National security exemption
This section introduces a new exemption for law enforcement processing by competent authorities, when this is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national security.
Although competent authorities are already able to restrict some of the data protection rights that people have if this is necessary to safeguard national security, this provides a wider exemption. It mirrors the national security exemption that already applies to general processing under the UK GDPR.
The new exemption potentially exempts a competent authority from the following requirements:
- The principles, apart from the requirement for the processing to be lawful, and the restrictions and safeguards for sensitive processing.
- The need to comply with people’s data protection rights.
- The need to notify people and the ICO about data breaches.
- The provisions about transfers of personal information to third countries, apart from:
- the requirement that the transfer must be for a law enforcement purpose;
- the need for the transfer’s authorisation, or other justification, when personal information was originally provided by a member state of the European Union; and
- the rules on subsequent transfers.
The section amends the national security certificate provisions so that they refer to certificates issued under the new exemption, rather than the pre-DUAA provisions.
The section also makes some consequential amendments to other legislation.
Intelligence services
Joint processing for intelligence services and competent authorities
This section introduces new provisions that allow qualifying competent authorities (who are subject to the law enforcement processing provisions in part 3 of the DPA 2018) and intelligence services bodies (who are subject to the intelligence services processing provisions in part 4 of the DPA 2018) to enter into a joint controllership arrangement. So long as the Secretary of State confirms that this is required in order to safeguard national security.
Processing under such an arrangement by a part 3 qualifying competent authority can be designated by the Secretary of State as subject to part 4 intelligence services processing requirements, rather than the usual part 3 requirements.
This would not have been possible under the pre-DUAA provisions and any such joint working would have had to be managed via data sharing agreements and practices.
A competent authority cannot use a designation notice for transfers of personal information outside the UK.
The Secretary of State is bringing forward regulations specifying the qualifying competent authorities that can potentially benefit from these provisions.
Applicants must ensure their request for a designation notice:
- is made jointly by one or more of the qualifying competent authorities, and one or more of the intelligence services;
- describes the processing, including the intended purposes and means of processing; and
- explains why they consider the designation is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security.
Applicants for a designation notice must:
- notify the Secretary of State without delay if they think that the designation is no longer necessary to safeguard national security; and
- provide the Secretary of State, on request, with a description of the processing covered by the notice and an explanation of why they think it is still needed for the purposes of safeguarding national security.
This section sets out what the Secretary of State must do when considering an application and issuing or withdrawing a designation notice.
It also gives the ICO some related duties and provides that a person affected by a designation notice may appeal to the Information Tribunal against the notice.
Joint processing: consequential amendments
This section makes some consequential amendments arising from the introduction of the new joint processing provisions.
Information Commissioner’s role
Duties of the Commissioner in carrying out functions
This section makes some changes to the duties of the ICO.
Codes of practice for the processing of personal data
This section inserts a requirement for the ICO to prepare codes of practice, giving guidance about good practice in the use of personal information, if required to do so by regulations made by the Secretary of State.
It says what the ICO must do when it prepares these codes and makes some consequential amendments.
Codes of practice: panels and impact assessments
This section inserts a requirement for the ICO to set up panels to consider codes of practice and sets out the ICO’s duties when doing this.
Manifestly unfounded or excessive requests to the Commissioner
This section amends the provisions that allow the ICO to refuse to act on manifestly unfounded or excessive requests, or to charge a reasonable fee for doing so.
The amendments mean that these provisions can apply to any requests, rather than just requests made by people the personal information is about or data protection officers.
Analysis of performance
This section says what the ICO must do when reporting to Parliament annually on how it is carrying out of its functions.
Notices from the Commissioner
This section allows the ICO to serve a notice under the DPA by post and email, rather than only having the option to hand deliver the notice or leave it at the person’s usual or last known address.
Enforcement
Power of the Commissioner to require documents
This section makes it clear that the ICO’s information notice powers allow it to obtain both information and documents.
Power of the Commissioner to require reports
This section amends the ICO’s assessment notice powers, giving it the power to require an organisation to nominate an approved person to prepare a report about a specified matter, and submit that report to the ICO.
The organisation is required to give reasonable assistance to the person preparing the report and to pay their costs.
The ICO is required to either approve the nomination or, if it is not satisfied that the person nominated is suitable, advise the organisation about why it has reached that conclusion and approve a suitable person itself.
If the organisation fails to nominate anyone within the timescale specified in the notice, the ICO is required to approve a suitable person itself.
It gives the ICO the power to issue a fine, if an organisation fails to give the person preparing the report reasonable assistance.
It also gives the ICO a duty to provide guidance on how it exercises these powers.
Assessment notices: removal of OFSTED restriction
This section removes a provision in the pre-DUAA DPA 2018 that exempted OFSTED from the ICO’s assessment notices powers.
Interview notices
This section introduces a new power allowing the ICO to compel a person to attend an interview and answer questions, if they work, or have worked, for or on behalf of an organisation that is subject to data protection law. This applies if the ICO suspects that a person or organisation has failed to comply with data protection law or has committed an offence under this law.
Under the pre-DUAA law, an organisation had a general duty to co-operate with the ICO, but the ICO did not have specific powers to make this happen.
It also gives the ICO some related duties and powers and makes some consequential amendments.
Penalty notices
This section extends the time period in which the ICO must issue a penalty notice after the date it issues a notice of intent, from six months to six months or as soon as is reasonably practicable.
It also introduces a new requirement on the ICO to issue a written notice confirming that it is not issuing a penalty notice, if this is the case. It should do so within the same time period, after it issues a notice of intent.
And it requires the ICO to provide guidance on the circumstances in which it would consider it necessary to take longer than six months to issue the penalty notice.
Annual report on regulatory action
This new provision sets out that the ICO must produce and publish an annual report on the regulatory action it has taken. It also specifies what the ICO must include in this report.
Complaints by data subjects
This section introduces a right for people to complain to organisations and competent authorities if they think that they’ve used their personal information in a way that doesn’t comply with the law.
It places an obligation on organisations and competent authorities to help people to make complaints, requiring them to take steps such as providing an electronic complaints form.
They must acknowledge complaints within 30 days and advise the complainant of the outcome without undue delay. They must also take appropriate steps in the meantime, such as making enquiries into the subject matter of the complaint and keeping the complainant informed about progress.
This section also makes some consequential amendments.
Court procedure in connection with subject access requests
This section provides that, if a court orders an organisation to provide it with information (so that it can decide whether or not someone has a right of access to that information) then the court will not be able to order the disclosure of the information, under court procedure rules, until it has made its decision.
It also provides that the court cannot order an organisation to carry out more extensive searches for this information than it would be required to do if the person did have a right of access.
Consequential amendments to the EITSET regulations
This section makes consequential amendments to the ICO’s enforcement powers under the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016.
Protection of prohibitions, restrictions and data subject’s rights
Protection of prohibitions, restrictions and data subject’s rights
This section inserts various amendments to make it clear that provisions about the use of personal information found in other laws, do not override or take precedence over the requirements of data protection legislation. And that nothing within the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (removal of the principle of supremacy of EU law) changes that.
Miscellaneous
Regulations under the UK GDPR
This section provides that the Secretary of State must consult with the ICO and anyone else they consider appropriate, when exercising their powers to make regulations.
It sets out some limited exceptions to this general rule and specifies some requirements of the Parliamentary negative and affirmative resolution procedures.
Further minor provision about data protection
This section references schedule 11: Further minor provision about data protection that makes some minor and consequential amendments.